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As Christians, Muslims and Jews throughout the Middle Ages were strug-
gling to come to terms with the ancient philosophical heritage, it seems al-
ways to have been the doctrine of the eternity of the world that posed the 
most formidable challenge. Most if not all Christian thinkers adhered to a 
literal interpretation of Genesis 1:1, according to which God, in the begin-
ning, created heaven and earth. But they differed widely on the question as 
to whether or not it was possible to demonstrate the truth of this belief by 
philosophical argument. The conflict between what we may call ‘rationalis-
tic’ and ‘fideistic’ attitudes to this problem came to a head in Western 
Europe in the thirteenth century, when Aristotle’s arguments in favour of 
eternity became a focus of attention.1 The brightest luminary on the thir-
teenth-century horizon, Thomas Aquinas, denied the possibility. In the end 
it was his opinion that carried the day. According to Thomas, there will al-
ways be equal arguments for and against a beginning of the world; the fact 
that there was a beginning is something we learn only from revelation; it is, 
in Thomas’ parlance, an article of faith (Summa theologiae 1a, q. 46, a. 2). 
This opinion became predominant also in modern philosophy. When it was 
reformulated as the First Antinomy of Reason in Kant’s Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft, and the assertion as well as the denial of a beginning were de-
clared to violate the necessary conditions for any possible experience, the 
debate between creationists and eternalists was finally laid to rest.2 And cos-
mology was handed over to the scientists. 
                                                
* Parts of this paper have been presented to various audiences (London 2006; Athens 2008; 
Uppsala 2010; Budapest 2011; Stockholm 2011), to whom I extend my thanks for valuable 
response. 
1 I take a ‘rationalistic’ attitude in this context to involve not the strong view that only 
rational argument can satisfactorily solve the problem, but the weaker view that rational 
argument can satisfactorily solve the problem. 
2 ‘Creationism’ is used in this paper for the reasoned belief that the world has at some point 
begun to exist, both as to its present structure and as to its matter (it was created ‘post ni-
hil’); conversely, ‘eternalism’ will be used without qualification for the reasoned belief that 
there has been no such beginning. Note that most late antique and medieval thinkers will 
distinguish the sort of eternity intended by this belief (infinite temporal duration, often 
called perpetuity or sempiternity) from ‘eternity proper’ (‘the possession of interminable 
life, all at once and completely’, to quote Boethius (Cons. 5 prosa 6). See further below, p. 
97. 
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Philoponus’ rationalistic outlook 
The opinion that there are equal arguments for and against a beginning of 
the world goes back to antiquity: it is reported by Philo of Alexandria (Ebr. 
199) as well as by Galen (Exp. med. 19), and no doubt in other sources. But 
those who maintained that the belief in a beginning of the world could be 
satisfactorily defended by philosophical arguments were also able to rely on 
ancient predecessors. Usually they would rely, directly or indirectly, on 
John Philoponus, and more specifically on his three works on the eternity of 
the world, in which he made a concerted effort to argue philosophically in 
favour of creationism.3 
Only one of these works, the earliest, survives practically in its entirety. 
It is known as De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum (or Contra Proclum for 
short). It consists of a detailed refutation from philosophical—as opposed to 
scriptural or patristic—premises of the Platonic Successor Proclus’ eighteen 
arguments in favour of eternalism. It is dated by the author to AD 529, the 
very year that Justinian enforced the closure of the school of philosophy at 
Athens.4 The second work (Contra Aristotelem) was a refutation of 
Aristotle’s arguments in De caelo 1 and Physics 8. It is partly known 
through quotations and reports in Simplicius’ commentaries on the relevant 
Aristotelian works.5 
                                                
3 There is some uncertainty as to the number and contents of Philoponus’ non-extant works 
on the eternity of the world. The Arabic bibliographies distinguish clearly between a refu-
tation of Aristotle in six books and a shorter treatise ‘showing that every body is finite and 
has finite power’ (Davidson 1969: 359). Thus, the shorter treatise seems to have been 
closely related if not identical in content to the (probably independent, see Davidson 1969: 
358–59) work reported by Simplicius at In Phys. 1326.37–1336.34. Similar content is also 
found in the second part of the first chapter of the Arabic summary of De contingentia 
mundi, which certainly must have been an independent work. Thus, it has been suggested 
that the work reported and discussed by Simplicius at In Phys. 1326.37–1336.34 is in fact 
identical to (the first chapter of) De contingentia mundi (Pines 1972: 341). On the other 
hand, towards the end of Simplicius’ reports and discussions of the sixth book of Contra 
Aristotelem, ‘which tries to eliminate the eternity of motion so that there can be no proof of 
the eternity of the world based on it’ (1182.28–30; cf. 1118.4–7), beginning at 1129.29 and 
seemingly continuing until 1182.27 (frs VI/108–33 Wildberg), we find an extended passage 
(1178.5–1179.26) that closely parallels the first part of the first chapter as well as the third 
chapter of the Arabic summary. If this passage was indeed part of the sixth book of Contra 
Aristotelem (it is included as fr. VI/132 by Wildberg), it is clear from the way it is 
introduced by Simplicius (ibid. 1178.5–9) that it was set apart from the preceding refutation 
of Aristotle’s arguments as a positive demonstration of the impossibility of a movement 
without beginning, in much the same way as De contingentia mundi is introduced as the 
demonstrative complement to Contra Proclum and Contra Aristotelem (Pines 1972: 321–
22; see also n. 8 below). 
4 Literally to the year 245 after Diocletian’s accession (Aet. 579.14–16). 
5 Fragments collected and translated in Wildberg (1987). 
A case for creationism    81 
 
The third work (De contingentia mundi) is only extant in the form of an 
Arabic summary (which is probably a translation of a Greek summary).6 In 
its preface (which seems to have been translated more or less in unabbrevi-
ated form), Philoponus explains that he has previously written works at-
tempting to refute the sophistical arguments of Proclus, Aristotle and others 
in favour of eternalism, and that he now wishes to demonstrate his creation-
ist thesis, since (as he says) the ‘perfect knowledge’ of things ‘which can 
(only) be known by syllogistic reasoning’ requires both the demonstration 
of the truth of the matter and the refutation of any sophistical arguments that 
have been employed to establish the contradictory of the truth.7 This seems 
to indicate that the two refutations and the demonstration were all part of a 
unified programme aimed at establishing first that creationism can be true 
and subsequently that it must be true.8 
Perhaps we should pause here for a moment to ask ourselves how it can 
be possible at the same time to pursue cosmology as a demonstrative sci-
ence and insist on the infallible truth of the Christian revelation—i.e. how to 
combine absolute rationalism and absolute faith. I can imagine at least two 
different ways of doing this. One is to subscribe to the notorious doctrine of 
the ‘double truth’: what is true in natural philosophy can be false in theol-
ogy, and vice versa. This doctrine was condemned by the Bishop of Paris in 
1277, but it is a moot point whether it really had any adherents.9 If it had, 
Philoponus was certainly not among them. Another possibility, and I think 
the one that Philoponus opted for, would be to assume that there can be no 
contradiction between natural philosophy—as correctly practised—and the 
Christian revelation—as correctly interpreted. We may call this a Harmony 
View of the relationship between natural philosophy and Christianity. Now, 
since all the Greek philosophers actually did contradict any historically con-
ceivable interpretation of the Christian revelation on at least some points, an 
important corollary of the Harmony View for anyone writing in late antiq-
                                                
6 Pines (1972: 344 and n. 288). 
7 I rely on the English translation by Pines (1972) as well as the French translation by 
Troupeau (1984). The quoted phrases are from Pines’ translation (1972: 322). 
8 Cf. Philoponus, Aet. 9.20–10.2. A similar description of his three works in favour of crea-
tionism is given by Philoponus in the preface to De opificio mundi (1.6–14, where lines 
1.7–13 seem to refer to the two refutations and lines 1.13–14 to De contingentia mundi). He 
goes on to explain that he has been ‘mildly rebuked’ for only having focussed on philoso-
phical arguments and not having paid due attention to the words of Moses (ibid. 1.14–2.5). 
De opificio mundi is thus conceived of as the exegetical complement to the philosophical 
trilogy, purporting to show (often through allegorical interpretation) that the revelation of 
the Pentateuch does not disagree with ‘the phenomena’, i.e. with scientifically observable 
facts (ibid. 2.19–25; 6.19–24). 
9 See Dales (1984). 
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uity or the Middle Ages will be that all the Greek philosophers made (phi-
losophical) mistakes, which must be rectified. This is, I think, what Contra 
Proclum and Contra Aristotelem are all about. In order to carry out the first 
part of his programme and establish that creationism can be true, Philoponus 
needs to show that Proclus’ and Aristotle’s premises either do not support 
their conclusions or else are false. No doubt the main aspiration of the pro-
gramme was to demonstrate the truth of creationism, by substituting the 
false premises with true ones and drawing the inferences correctly. But in so 
far as he was considered to have carried out this task successfully, 
Philoponus also managed, in the process, to vindicate natural philosophy 
and convince his readers of its fundamental solidarity with the Christian 
cause. 
 
Philoponus’ Byzantine legacy 
The significance of Philoponus’ arguments for the Islamic and Jewish cos-
mological traditions is well attested and well known.10 The arguments were 
partly transmitted via Islamic rationalist theology (kalām), and partly 
through Al-Kindī’s works. From the Islamic and Jewish cosmologists they 
were picked up by Latin Christian philosophers and theologians.11 What is 
probably less well known is that variants, or descendants, of some of these 
arguments are also well established in Middle and Late Byzantine textbooks 
and treatises on cosmology. 
This is true especially of the argument known in the Arabic tradition as 
‘John the Grammarian’s’, for which our main source is the previously men-
tioned summary of De contingentia mundi, chap. 1. This argument is based 
on two propositions which Aristotle is supposed to have proved in the De 
caelo and the Physics respectively: (1) The world is a finite body, and (2) 
every finite body possesses finite power. From these propositions and the 
definition of ‘finite power’ as a power, the effect of which will eventually 
cease, it follows that the world is not eternal. The objection that the world 
may be sustained by infinite power deriving from an incorporeal source, 
namely the unmoved mover or God, is brushed aside by Philoponus as be-
ing irrelevant, since, as Aristotle would admit (Cael. 1.12, 281b20–22), a 
                                                
10 See especially Davidson (1969) and (1987). 
11 To mention but the two most well-known examples, the argument from the impossibility 
of an actualized infinity, adumbrated by Philoponus at Aet. 9.20–13.11 and set out in fur-
ther detail in book 6 of Contra Aristotelem (if this is the text reported by Simplicius, In 
Phys. 1178.5–1179.26) as well as in chap. 3 of De contingentia mundi, was known both to 
Thomas Aquinas, who rejected it (Summa contra Gentiles lib. 2, c. 38) and to Bonaventure, 
who accepted it as sound (Comm. in Sent. lib. 2, d. 1,  p. 1, a. 1, q. 2). 
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world which has a natural potentiality for being destroyed must in the 
course of an infinite period of time at some point actually be destroyed. 
Thus it must also have come into existence in the beginning, according to 
the axiom (stated by Plato at Phaedrus 245d3–4 and argued by Aristotle in 
Cael. 1.12) that everything capable of being destroyed has necessarily come 
into existence.12 
‘John the Grammarian’s argument’ is also reported by Simplicius (In 
Phys. 1327.11–1329.12), but it is entirely possible that it was first intro-
duced in Middle Byzantine cosmology by way of the Arabic tradition. A 
slightly garbled version of it appears, together with a number of other argu-
ments familiar from Philoponus’ works, in the Conspectus rerum natural-
ium (3.30) by Symeon Seth of Antioch, who is well known as a translator 
from Arabic in the latter half of the eleventh century. Symeon argues, in 
open contradiction to both Plato and Aristotle, that since the world is a 
body, and every body possesses finite power, it must also have a beginning 
and an end. To dispel any doubt that the power of the world is finite he adds, 
somewhat unconvincingly, that while the fixed-star sphere completes a 
revolution in twenty-four hours, it would have done so in less time had it 
had greater power. 
‘John the Grammarian’s argument’ also appears in the works of John 
Italos, an approximate contemporary of Symeon. Thus we are told in his 
Quaestiones quodlibetales (71.28–42) that not only did Plato expressly 
teach that the world has had a beginning, even Aristotle implied as much, 
since it follows from his own proofs of the incorporeality of the first mover 
in Physics 8 that the world, being a body and thus necessarily finite and pos-
sessed of finite power, is not eternal. 
The same argument was restated in Late Byzantium by Nikephoros 
Blemmydes, who took it upon himself, in his widely circulated Epitome 
physica (PG 142, coll. 1224B–1228D), to refute a number of arguments in 
favour of eternalism. He attributed these to the Peripatetic school, but seems 
in fact to have collected them, together with their refutations, from 
Philoponus’ works, mainly Contra Proclum.13 In support of the premise that 
the power of the world is finite Blemmydes referred to the impossibility of 
any part of a finite whole having infinite power, since this would entail that 
the whole has a power exceeding the infinite; but if the parts have finite 
                                                
12 The extensive reliance on this axiom and its converse (for which see below, pp. 94–95) 
and its consequences for Christian cosmology and psychology in late antiquity (especially 
in the works of Aeneas of Gaza and John of Scythopolis) is explored in Krausmüller 
(2009). 
13 For details, see Bydén (2003: 182–84 and notes). 
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power the finite whole must have so too (coll. 1225B–E). Variants of ‘John 
the Grammarian’s argument’ may also be identifiable, in different stages of 
degeneration, and probably deriving proximately from Blemmydes, in 
Nikephoros Choumnos’ On the Nature of the World (c. 1315) and 
Nikephoros Gregoras’ Florentius (probably written in 1337).14 
It is striking that most of these writers do not only owe their arguments in 
favour of creationism to Philoponus, but in addition share his rationalistic 
approach to the problem under discussion. Indeed, the essential harmony 
between natural philosophy and Christianity seems to be taken for granted 
by the majority of Byzantine cosmological writers. Symeon Seth, for in-
stance, who explains in his preface that he wants to present more than a 
mere doxography, by giving demonstrative proofs of the true opinion on 
each subject (Consp. 1.1–9), for the most part argues in favour of the 
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic world view, except when it comes to eternalism and 
a few other doctrines difficult to reconcile with the Christian faith, which he 
takes pains to argue against.15 Blemmydes’ Epitome physica is a work in 
much the same vein as Symeon’s Conspectus, only on a rather more ency-
clopaedic scale, exhibiting the same overall adherence to the natural phi-
losophy of Aristotle and his commentators, revised in theologically sensitive 
areas with the help of philosophical arguments, drawn not only from 
Philoponus but also from the Stoic Cleomedes and others. Similarly, 
Choumnos begins his treatise by declaring his bold ambition to settle the 
debate on the nature of the world by proceeding demonstratively from se-
curely established principles and definitions, such as are agreed upon by 
everyone, and continues by blending arguments in favour of Aristotle and 
Ptolemy with arguments against them, whenever this is required for the de-
fence of the Christian doctrine.16 Gregoras, on the other hand, was alto-
                                                
14 Choumnos in Sakkelion (1890: 76.12–20); Gregoras, Florentius, 1487–97. It is, how-
ever, entirely possible that Gregoras is reasoning independently on the basis of Aristotle’s 
De caelo, whereas Choumnos may be developing a point in Ps.-Justin, Confutatio dogma-
tum quorundam Aristotelis (130C), which is probably somewhat earlier than Philoponus’ 
works (see below, n. 30). 
15 In Consp. 29, he argues that the heavenly spheres and bodies can have no souls, since 
they are simpler and thus less ‘organic’ than the bodies of plants, which have only one soul 
faculty. In Consp. 37, he denies that the heavens are composed of a fifth body, on the 
grounds that the arguments of those (Plato, Proclus and Philoponus) who think it is com-
posed of the finest part of the four elements, especially fire and air, are stronger. In Consp. 
43, he suggests that the astronomical hypotheses of epicycles and eccentrics are unneces-
sary, since they were introduced in order to avoid having to ascribe retrograde motions to 
the planets, considered by the Greeks to be gods (and thus unworthy of such motions). 
16 For Choumnos’ prefatory declaration, see Sakkelion (1890: 75.14–23). 
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gether more sceptically—and fideistically—inclined.17 In any case, it does 
not seem exceedingly far-fetched to hypothesize that the conviction that the 
view of Genesis 1:1 admits of proof by philosophical argument was spread 
to the Byzantine world from the same source that provided the standard 
philosophical arguments in favour of the selfsame view, namely 
Philoponus’ works on the eternity of the world. 
 
Creationism and Christianity 
It should be noted that the fact that Philoponus considered the problem as to 
whether or not the world has had a beginning to admit of resolution by ra-
tional argument does not in any way imply that he regarded the outcome of 
the argument as indifferent from the point of view of his Christian faith. It 
may seem superfluous to mention this, but it has in fact been claimed in re-
cent years that ‘Philoponus’ rejection of Proclus’ arguments is motivated by 
philosophy, not Christianity’.18 For a number of reasons, I think this claim is 
wrong. It is certainly not supported by the circumstance that Philoponus 
fails to make use of any specifically Christian premises in his refutation of 
Proclus. A refutation is a dialectical exchange. It has to start out from 
premises that the opponent accepts, otherwise it cannot reach its goal. A 
philosophical demonstration, on the other hand, such as Philoponus seems 
to have attempted in De contingentia mundi, must start out from premises 
that are (as Aristotle says in the Topics) true and primary, and that anyone 
with any philosophical understanding will accept. 
One reason—albeit by no means a decisive one—for thinking that the 
claim about Philoponus’ motivation is wrong is that it is highly unlikely that 
any Greek Christian writing on cosmology in the sixth century would deny 
that the world—its structure as well as its matter—has had a beginning. It is 
sometimes asserted that creationism has never been a unanimous view 
among Christians. The reality, for once, seems less complicated. It is true 
that a clear and consistent orthodox position on the issue seems to have been 
arrived at only through the confrontation with various forms of Gnosticism 
espousing eternalism in the course of the second century.19 But after that it 
was, as far as I can see, universally adopted. The four examples occasionally 
cited as evidence for late antique Greek Christian belief in the eternity of the 
                                                
17 For Gregoras’ epistemology, see Bydén (2012). 
18 ‘[T]here is no evidence that Philoponus brought his Christian beliefs to bear on philoso-
phy. Indeed, the evidence is all the other way: he apparently did not bring his Christianity 
to the banquet of philosophy’ (Lang & Macro 2001: 12). 
19 See the classic study by May (1978: 151–84). 
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world, namely a passage in Nemesius (late fourth century), one in Synesius 
(AD 409), one in Ps.-David or Elias (late sixth century), and one in Ps.-
Philoponus or Stephanus (early seventh century), are all of dubious rele-
vance. 
To begin with Nemesius (Nat. hom. 2.31.8–16), who dismisses as irra-
tional Eunomius’ view that the world will be destroyed as soon as it has 
been completed, it is not to the idea that the world will be destroyed that he 
objects. It is to the idea that the world has not yet been completed, which 
bears no direct relation to the question of the eternity of the world, either a 
parte ante or a parte post. 
Synesius (Epist. 105, 87–88) does indeed state his conviction that the 
world will never be destroyed. He does not, however, claim that this is a 
Christian view. On the contrary, he mentions it as an example of the 
discrepancy between his own, philosophically induced, opinions and those 
accepted by the Church, which makes him hesitant to take up the bishopric 
that has been offered to him. If anything, then, the passage is indicative of 
the fact that Christians and pagan philosophers in the early fifth century 
were strongly committed to contradictory positions. 
Next, ?Elias (In Cat. 187.6–7) explains that the parts of a continuum 
have to be taken potentially and not actually, for otherwise, he says, ‘the 
definition will be destructive’, adding, parenthetically, that ‘we will also 
make the heavens, being continuous and impassible (συνεχῆ ὄντα καὶ 
ἀπαθῆ), destructive and divisible’. It is difficult to understand what this is 
supposed to mean, and possibly the text is corrupt. In any case, this casual 
remark, made in the course of a lecture on elementary logic, is hardly 
sufficient to label the author as an eternalist, especially since the participle is 
not necessarily factive (it may have conditional force).20 
Much the same can be said of Ps.-Philoponus (?Stephanus, In De an. 
540.24–28), who simply reports some anonymous people contending that in 
the world as a whole no temporal priority obtains between actuality and po-
tentiality, for if the world is eternal, as Aristotle believes, they must be si-
multaneous; the author aptly compares the problem to the conundrum about 
the hen and the egg. 
So much for the evidence of Greek Christian belief in the eternity of the 
world from the third century onwards. It is not even clear whether any eter-
nalists could be recruited from among the ancient Latin Christians. 
                                                
20 Of course, it is not sufficient to label him as a non-eternalist either, so it cannot be used to 
establish the author’s religious persuasion (his Christianity has been called into question by 
Wildberg 1990: 42–45). 
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Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy Book 5, Prose 6 has often been ad-
duced as an example, but Richard Sorabji has pointed out, rightly to my 
mind, that ‘[t]he lack of a beginning or end is put forward as a hypothesis of 
Aristotle and Plato’ without being clearly endorsed by Boethius (1983: 196 
n. 28).21 
Another reason—and a more important one—for doubting the claim that 
the motivation for Contra Proclum was unrelated to Philoponus’ Christian 
faith is that it seems unlikely that any Greek non-Christian writing on cos-
mology at this time would deny that the world (even the present cosmic 
structure) is eternal.22 All known pagan philosophers in the fifth and sixth 
centuries pledged their allegiance to Plato.23 And Platonists had always 
agreed that the perceptible world was created (γενητός), not only in the 
sense of being composite and thus necessarily involved in a process of 
coming-to-be and passing-away, but also in the sense that it was created by 
a cause.24 For without a cause, Plato said in the Timaeus (28a), nothing can 
be created. They differed, however, as to whether or not this implied that the 
perceptible world had had a beginning. And again, they all held that the 
process of coming-to-be and passing-away unfolds in time, but they dis-
agreed as to whether or not this meant that time had had a beginning. 
The authoritative text on these questions was Plato’s Timaeus. At first 
blush, the Timaeus would appear to answer them in a fairly unambiguous 
way: at 28b it is plainly stated that the cosmos, inasmuch as it is corporeal 
and therefore perceptible, did not always exist, but has come into being, be-
ginning from some starting-point (γέγονεν, ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάµενος). 
And at 38b it is explained that time came into being simultaneously with the 
                                                
21 That is to say, the whole passage of Book 5, Prose 6, sects 10–14 is to be understood as 
an explication of Plato’s view in support of Boethius’ rejection (in sect. 9) of the attribution 
of the coeternity thesis to the Athenian philosopher. 
22 I.e. in the sense of not having ever begun to exist (cf. n. 2 above). It is not at all unlikely 
that they would deny that it is eternal in the atemporal sense in which God is. For the dis-
tinction between perpetuity and eternity proper, see below, p. 97. Asclepius (In Met. 
185.32–186.3) says (apparently reporting—ἀπὸ φωνῆς—Ammonius) that some people 
claim (φασιν 185.32 and 186.1, in the latter instance changed into φησίν by Hayduck) that 
Aristotle agrees with Plato (Tim. 41a–b) that the heavens are both in substance and in their 
activity destructible, but will be maintained forever since they emanate from the first prin-
ciple. But later (In Met. 194.19–195.4) he explains that Aristotle and Plato considered that 
the heavenly bodies are indeed perpetual (ἀίδια) and indestructible in substance, but not in 
their activity, and also not conceptually, since they are material and thus composite. 
23 I am not aware of any 5th–6th-century Greek writers on cosmology who were neither 
Christian nor pagan. 
24 See the synopsis of interpretative possibilities by Calvenus Taurus (fl. c. AD 140) apud 
Philoponum, Aet. 145.13–147.25. 
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heaven, in order that they may also be dissolved simultaneously, in so far as 
this will happen. But there is a complication: the account of the Timaeus is 
expressly said by the eponymous main speaker to lack in accuracy and con-
sistency, since it is adapted to the capabilities of mortal men (29c–d). It is 
only a plausible story (an εἰκὼς µῦθος). 
A non-literal interpretation to the effect that the Timaeus passages should 
not be taken to imply a beginning of the cosmos and of time was proposed 
already by Plato’s second successor as head of the Academy, Xenocrates.25 
He was followed, not in the details of his interpretation but in his rejection 
of literalism, by the vast majority of Platonists for centuries to come. 
Aristotle, as we have seen, took the account of the Timaeus at face value, 
and tried to refute it. In the early imperial period, Middle Platonists like 
Plutarch and Atticus also defended a literal interpretation;26 but when the 
Timaeus became a set text in the Neoplatonic schools, around the turn of the 
third century, an exegetical orthodoxy insisting on eternal creation seems to 
have rapidly evolved. What Plato had meant, according to this orthodoxy, 
was simply that the perceptible world, being a composite thing, is the site of 
a perpetual process of coming-to-be and passing-away that is dependent for 
its continuation on a cause, which really is.27 It has been suggested that the 
confrontation with Christianity was instrumental in the firm establishment 
of this interpretation.28 Be that as it may: by the time the literal interpreta-
tion was subjected to Proclus’ criticism in his commentary on the Timaeus 
and in his eighteen arguments in favour of eternalism, that is to say in the 
mid-fifth century, it had had no currency in Platonic circles for at least two 
hundred years.29 
In these historical circumstances, then, when every Christian cosmologist 
and no non-Christian cosmologist could be expected to defend creationism, 
it seems perverse to insist that the fact that Philoponus did so had nothing to 
do with his Christianity. It is exceedingly likely that Philoponus would not 
                                                
25 What the doctrine of creation was meant to suggest, according to Xenocrates, was rather 
that the complex structures of the world are always constituted by a disarray of primary 
elements (Aristotle, Cael. 1.10, 279b32–280a2 with Simplicius, In Cael. 303.32–304.15). 
26 Atticus, fr. 6 Baudry; Plutarch, De an. proc. 1014a–c; cf. Proclus, In Tim. 1, 276.30–
277.7; 1, 381.26–382.4. 
27 According to Proclus (In Tim. 1, 277.8–17), Crantor understood γενητός in this context 
to mean ‘derived from an external source’, whereas Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus took 
it to mean ‘composite’. Proclus expresses his agreement with both parties, although his 
accounts of Plotinus’ and Porphyry’s views seem to be inaccurate (see Phillips 1997). 
28 See Niehoff (2007: 178–91). 
29 Note, however, that Atticus’ exegesis of Timaeus 28b–d is quoted approvingly by Aeneas 
of Gaza in Theoph. 46.16–23. 
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have defended creationism had he not been a Christian. That is tantamount 
to saying that his refutation of Proclus was most probably motivated by his 
Christianity. 
Indeed, as Michael Share has shown (2004: 4–6), there are passages in 
Contra Proclum that clearly imply that Philoponus saw himself in this work 
as the defender of the Christian truth. Moreover, as Share points out, some 
of these passages also show that Philoponus addressed himself at least 
partly to a Christian audience. This leads us straight to the question regard-
ing the more specific purpose of Contra Proclum and the two other works. 
Why would Philoponus take the trouble to write detailed refutations of 
Proclus and Aristotle as well as a demonstration of the creationist thesis for 
the benefit of a Christian audience? After all, this audience would have pre-
cious little need for the ‘perfect knowledge’ described in the preface to De 
contingentia mundi, since it had already found the truth in the Bible. What, 
in short, may have compelled Philoponus to launch his rationalistic pro-
gramme, and thus, accidentally, to shape the future of cosmology in the 
Middle Ages? 
 
Creationist works before Philoponus: 
Aeneas, Procopius and Zacharias 
Some light on this problem might be shed by a few flashbacks to those 
works that were written in defence of creationism in the preceding couple of 
generations. For Philoponus’ arguments themselves have ancestors in a 
small corpus of works from around the turn of the fifth century, which bear 
testimony to the Christian preoccupation with the question of the eternity of 
the world in the period between Proclus and Philoponus. Three of these 
works were written by three different authors associated with the flourishing 
city of Gaza. A fourth work that should probably be assigned to this period 
is a treatise known as Ps.-Justin, Confutatio dogmatum quorundam 
Aristotelis.30 
Of the three Gazan authors the eldest was Aeneas of Gaza (c. 430–post 
518), professor of rhetoric in his hometown and the author of a Plato-style 
philosophical dialogue called Theophrastus (after 484).31 This work is 
                                                
30 On the Confutatio, see Boeri (2009). Note that while Ps.-Justin expressly rejects the 
rationalistic approach to creationism in his preface (col. 110C–E), Boeri makes a convinc-
ing case for regarding his programme as in effect rationalistic in spite of this (2009: 100–
113; 131–35). 
31 On the Theophrastus, see Champion (2011); Krausmüller (2009: 54–58); Wacht (1969). 
An English translation for Duckworth’s Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series by 
Sebastian Gertz, John Dillon and Donald Russell has been announced (2012). 
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primarily concerned with questions pertaining to the individual human soul, 
its pre-existence (which is denied) and its immortality (which is affirmed). It 
also enters into details on matters of eschatology, but deals with the eternity 
a parte ante of both matter and the present cosmic structure in a more per-
functory way (43.22–48.17). The two characters of the frame dialogue are 
said to have been students of Hierocles at the Platonic school of Alexandria, 
and even if this does not prove anything about Aeneas’ own education, it is 
clear that he was conversant with some of Hierocles’ works.32 
The second Gazan creationist is Procopius of Gaza (c. 465–529), who 
also became a professor of rhetoric in his hometown after studying in 
Alexandria. Procopius was not, as some scholars have believed, the author 
of a refutation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology, which has been shown to 
be a work of the twelfth century.33 But he was the author of a commentary 
on Genesis (PG 87a, coll. 21–512), and the reason for mentioning him here 
is that he devoted a section of the introduction to this commentary (coll. 
29A–33B) to deducing a number of allegedly absurd or impossible conse-
quences from the view that the creation is coeternal (συναΐδιος) with the 
creator, which he ascribed to the Greek philosophers. 
As we shall see, the view that the creation is coeternal with the creator is 
in fact not found in any ancient pagan philosophers. But it is ascribed to 
them not only by Procopius, but also by many other Christians, including 
Procopius’ contemporary fellow Gazan Zacharias (465/6–post 536), who 
earned his epithet Scholasticus by writing an ecclesiastical history covering 
most of the latter half of the fifth century. Some scholars think he was in 
fact Procopius’ brother.34 
Like his older compatriot Aeneas, Zacharias composed a dialogue, the 
Ammonius.35 In this dialogue the question of the eternity of the world is dis-
cussed at length. The action is partly set in the lecture room of Ammonius 
Hermiae, the former student of Proclus and future teacher of Philoponus, at 
the Platonic school of Alexandria. To all appearances it draws on personal 
experience, even though it borrows a couple of arguments from Aeneas, and 
others, as we shall see, from other literary sources. In his early student years 
                                                
32 Cf. Schibli (2002: 12 and n. 43). 
33 The author’s name is Nicholas, Bishop of Methone. On his refutation of Proclus, see 
Angelou (1984). 
34 Summary of the debate in Minniti Colonna (1973: 18–20). 
35 The standard work on the Ammonius is still Minniti Colonna’s edition with introduction, 
commentary and Italian translation (1973). An English translation for Duckworth’s Ancient 
Commentators on Aristotle series by Sebastian Gertz, John Dillon and Donald Russell has 
been announced (2012). 
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Zacharias belonged to the philoponoi of Alexandria, a brotherhood of zeal-
ous laymen, whose ‘favorite task’, in the words of Frank Trombley (1993–
94: 2:1), ‘was monitoring the activities of the pagan professors for sacrifice 
and other cult practices’. He later studied law at Beirut and practised it in 
Constantinople, until he was appointed bishop of Mytilene sometime before 
536. 
The thesis argued in the Ammonius is stated in the subheading:  
The world is not coeternal with God but is in fact His creation, which, having begun 
from a temporal starting-point, is also destroyed whenever it occurs to the Creator to 
transform it, and the principle of the goodness of God is in no way vitiated by this thesis 
(Amm. 1–5).36 
Before I go on to discuss the arguments presented pro and contra this thesis, 
let me say a few words about the overall structure of the work. The frame 
dialogue is set in Beirut. A former student of Ammonius has just arrived 
from Alexandria to study law. Another former student of Ammonius, who is 
a Christian (and is identified in the preamble, Amm. 11–12, as the author 
himself), recounts to him two conversations between himself and their 
common teacher on the question of the eternity of the world. The first is said 
to have taken place during a class on Aristotle’s Physics (Book 8, appar-
ently) and the second a couple of days later during a class on the Ethics 
(Book 1, chapter 6, apparently). Sandwiched between these conversations is 
a report of a discussion in the Temple of the Muses between the Christian 
and Ammonius’ brightest student, the aspiring physician Gesius. Gesius too 
is a historical figure, in fact a friend and correspondent of Aeneas and 
Procopius, who indeed lived to become one of the most celebrated medical 
teachers of his day.37 In the final part of the frame dialogue the Christian’s 
interlocutor raises the interesting question as to why the world was not cre-
ated indestructible from the outset and the pagan and Christian positions are 
then summarized. 
Zacharias was apparently as convinced as Philoponus about the demon-
strability of Christian creationism. At one point his alter ego completely 
loses patience with the pagan philosophers who 
assume that Christianity is only protected by the faith, and does not in addition take joy 
and pride in incontrovertible arguments and demonstrative necessities, on account of 
                                                
36 ὅτι οὐ συναΐδιος τῷ θεῷ ὁ κόσµος, ἀλλὰ δηµιούργηµα αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει, ὃ ἀπ’ 
ἀρχῆς χρονικῆς ἀρξάµενον καὶ φθείρεται, ὅταν παραστῇ τῷ δηµιουργήσαντι τοῦτο 
µεταποιῆσαι· καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκ τούτου ὁ τῆς ἀγαθότητος τοῦ θεοῦ βλάπτεται λόγος … 
37 On Gesius, see Watts (2009). 
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being the only religion that expresses and clothes itself in true belief, pure ratiocination 
and demonstration based on the laws of reason and the actual facts (Amm. 148–53).38 
In the main part of the dialogue there are basically two arguments against 
creationism advanced by ‘Ammonius’ and five by ‘Gesius’. One of 
‘Gesius’’ arguments is in effect identical to one of ‘Ammonius’’. So in total 
we are offered six arguments against creationism. With a bit of good will I 
think it is possible to identify five of these as variants of arguments found 
also in Proclus’ defence of eternalism, as quoted by Philoponus.39 ‘The 
Christian’ attempts to refute all of them; his refutations sometimes prompt 
defences from ‘Ammonius’ and ‘Gesius’, which are then in turn responded 
to. In addition, four positive arguments in favour of creationism are offered 
by ‘the Christian’.40 Two of these, to which I shall come back, turn partly on 
the notion of coeternity mentioned above. 
 
The historicity of the Ammonius 
Some scholars have suggested that Zacharias’ dialogue may serve as a com-
plementary source for the philosophy of the historical Ammonius. One of 
the earliest and most assertive of these scholars was Pierre Courcelle, who 
believed that the discussions reported by Zacharias actually took place in the 
summer of 486 or 487.41 In a somewhat more reflective vein, Philip Merlan 
                                                
38 … οἰόµενοι τὸν Χριστιανισµὸν µόνῳ τῷ πιστεύειν τειχίζεσθαι, καὶ µὴ πρὸς τούτῳ 
λόγοις ἀφύκτοις καὶ ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἀνάγκαις ἐπιγανύσκεσθαί τε καὶ ἁβρύνεσθαι, ὡς 
µόνην εἶναι ταύτην εὐσέβειαν τὴν πίστει ἀγαθῇ καὶ λογισµοῖς ἀκιβδήλοις καὶ ἀπο-
δείξεσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων καὶ ταῖς δι’ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγµάτων ἐπανθοῦσάν τε καὶ 
καλλυνοµένην. 
39 With ‘Ammonius’ 1 (Amm. 106–13; 131–43) cf. Proclus 1 and 6 (see below); with 
‘Ammonius’ 2 (Amm. 117–26; 1078–83) cf. Proclus 3 and 16; with ‘Gesius’ 1 (Amm. 368–
460) cf. Proclus 3 (and Aeneas, Theophrastus 43.23–24); with ‘Gesius’ 2 (Amm. 553–61) 
cf. Proclus 5; with ‘Gesius’ 3 (Amm. 576–82) cf. Proclus 1 and 6; with ‘Gesius’ 4 (Amm. 
730–34) cf. Proclus 1 and especially Augustine, Civ. Dei 12.15.1 and Trin. 5.16; with 
‘Gesius’ 5 (Amm. 896–902) cf. Basil, In Hex. 1.3.9–11. 
40 (1) Argument from the nature of the world: the world consists of destructible parts (Amm. 
203–7; 658–67; 931–36; see also the appeal at 1290–92 to the principle that what is com-
posite must be dissolved, found in Plato, Phaedo 78c and Aristotle, Metaph. 14.2, not en-
tered in Minniti Colonna’s apparatus fontium). Cf. Aeneas, Theophr. 48.12–17 and Basil, 
In Hex. 1.3.25–32; (2) Argument from the nature of god: axiological priority entails tempo-
ral priority (Amm. 516–20; 958–68); (3) Argument from the nature of god: productively 
causal priority entails temporal priority (since productive causation involves volition and 
the will to create must be temporally prior to the act of creation) (Amm. 754–58; 778–89; 
1028–74); (4) Argument from the nature of god: unique attributes (Amm. 1005–23). 
41 Although he qualified his position: ‘Il ne faudrait pas croire que tout est historique dans 
ce récit; l’intention apologétique y est trop évidente …’ (1935: 216). Arguably 
Siniossoglou (2005) goes even further than Courcelle, relying as he does on Zacharias as a 
direct source for Ammonius’ views (repeatedly cited as ‘Ammonius ap. Zacharias’) without 
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assumed that Zacharias’ dialogue was ‘essentially historic’ and that 
‘Ammonius … actually and in essence professed the doctrines ascribed to 
[him] by Zacharias’ (1968: 194). On the strength of this assumption he went 
on to draw some fairly far-reaching inferences, as for instance that 
Ammonius had not recognized the first absolutely transcendent hypostasis 
of orthodox Neoplatonism (the One), but regarded the second hypostasis, 
which he identified with both the Aristotelian Intellect and the Platonic 
Demiurge, as the supreme deity, the productive as well as final cause of the 
perceptible world.42 These inferences were in turn taken by Merlan to 
corroborate Karl Praechter’s thesis that the Alexandrian school of Neoplato-
nism differed markedly from the Athenian school in emphasizing its 
Aristotelian elements and even accommodating itself to Christianity (1968: 
199–201). 
Many objections have been raised to Praechter’s thesis in recent years. 
Concerning Ammonius it was pointed out by Koenrad Verrycken that the 
subject matter of Zacharias’ dialogue is natural philosophy rather than the-
ology, and that for this reason we should not expect to find any internal ar-
ticulation of the divine creative principle in it. As Verrycken said, even 
Proclus nowhere in his eighteen arguments in favour of eternalism speaks of 
the first hypostasis, but this has not led anyone to conclude that he did not 
recognize it. Ammonius’ adherence to the orthodox Neoplatonic account of 
three hypostases, the One, Intellect and Soul, is well attested in other 
sources. The moral is that Zacharias’ dialogue should not be used as evi-
dence for Ammonius’ theology (1990: 210–12). 
Verrycken did not, however, question the historicity of Zacharias’ dia-
logue.42bis Now, if Merlan’s and others’ assumption that the dialogue is 
‘essentially historic’ stands up to scrutiny, this means that we will still be 
entitled to draw inferences concerning Ammonius’ natural philosophy from 
it, even if not concerning his theology. But if the assumption proves 
unfounded, any inferences concerning Ammonius’ natural philosophy are of 
course equally unwarranted. And since such inferences have in fact been 
drawn, I think it would be useful to subject the assumption to scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                        
any hint that this may be methodologically problematic. 
42 Ammonius’ identification of the productive and the final cause of the world is evidenced 
in other sources (Simplicius, In Cael. 271.18–21; In Phys. 1363.8–12). See below, n. 44. 
42bis This paper was already prepared for print when I was made aware of Verrycken (2001), 
in which the historicity of the Ammonius is indeed questioned. Some of the arguments and 
many of the conclusions in that paper have their counterparts in this one. My heartfelt 
thanks to Sebastian Gertz for the reference. 
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The arguments of the Ammonius 
Let us first try to see to what extent the testimony of other sources lends 
support to Merlan’s assumption. It will be found, I think, that some of the 
statements attributed to ‘Ammonius’ and ‘Gesius’ in Zacharias’ dialogue 
may well correspond more or less accurately to the views of their historical 
namesakes. ‘Ammonius’’ insistence that Plato and Aristotle are in agree-
ment on everything, even on the theory of Forms, is a case in point.43 Simi-
larly, the repeated assertion that God is a productive cause may reflect the 
historical Ammonius’ preoccupation with showing that Aristotle’s unmoved 
mover, despite appearances, is a productive cause.44 Much the same can be 
said of ‘Ammonius’’ first argument against creationism. It combines ele-
ments from Proclus’ first and sixth arguments in favour of eternalism with 
some other material in a rather interesting way. 
Let me first recapitulate Proclus’ first argument. It is based on assump-
tions about the nature of the creator as well as that of his creation, the world. 
Both the creator and the world are good. If the creator is eternally so and in 
addition omnipotent, it follows that he has always been both willing and 
able to ensure that the world exist. If he had not, he would also have been 
subject to change. But he cannot have been subject to change, so the world 
must always have existed.45 
In his sixth argument, Proclus assumes, on the authority of the Timaeus 
(41a–b), that only the creator can dissolve the world. On the other hand, 
only an evil power will dissolve something good. The world is good. And 
the creator is also good. Therefore the world will not be dissolved by any-
one. What will not be dissolved is indestructible. Therefore the world is in-
destructible. But by the axiom stated by Plato at Rep. VIII 546a2 and argued 
                                                
43 Amm. 946–52. Cf. Asclepius, In Metaph. 69.17–27.  
44 See especially Amm. 958–1056. Cf. Ammonius apud Simpl. In Phys. 1363.8–13; cf. In 
Cael. 271.18–21. However, in the discussion with ‘Gesius’ (Amm. 490–504), Zacharias 
makes it clear that he considers the pagan concepts of ‘creation’ and ‘production’ as being 
concerned with the imposition of form and order on preexisting matter rather than with the 
bringing forth of substances, contrary to the historical Ammonius’ view as reported by 
Simplicius (In Phys. 1363.2–8). In the same vein, Zacharias depicts ‘Ammonius’ as being 
ignorant of the Neoplatonic distinction between proper, cooperative and instrumental 
causes at Amm. 209–30 (cf. Sorabji 1983: 305–6). 
45 Proclus’ first argument and part of Philoponus’ reply to it went missing from the arche-
type (Marc. gr. 236, 9th–10th cent.) before the oldest extant descendant (Par. gr. 2058, 
15th/16th cent.) was copied, but an Arabic translation of precisely this part of the text sur-
vives. An English translation by Peter Adamson will be found in Share (2004); another, by 
John McGinnis, in Lang & Macro (2001). 
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by Aristotle in De caelo 1.12, what is indestructible must also be uncreated. 
Therefore the world is eternal, a parte post as well as a parte ante.46 
Let us now compare this with ‘Ammonius’’ first argument in Zacharias’ 
dialogue, which is as follows (Amm. 102–13; 127–43): Assuming that the 
world is good and the creator is good, how could the world come to an end? 
Would it be (a) contrary to the creator’s wish or (b) in accordance with it? If 
(a), then god is impotent. But if (b), then why would the creator wish to de-
stroy something good? Three possibilities are considered. (i) Perhaps it is in 
order to create something better? Impossible ex hypothesi (the world is the 
best of created things). (ii) Perhaps it is in order to create something worse? 
Blasphemy! (iii) Perhaps, then, to create something equally good? That 
would be otiose. So if god is not impotent, evil, or simply frivolous, the 
world cannot come to an end. And if it cannot come to an end, then by the 
Platonic and Aristotelian axiom it cannot have come into being either. 
Like Proclus’ sixth argument, then, ‘Ammonius’’ first argument sets out 
first to establish the impossibility of an end to the world and then infers the 
impossibility of a beginning by the Platonic and Aristotelian axiom. Like 
Proclus’ first argument, it is based on the divine attributes of goodness and 
omnipotence (to which ‘Ammonius’ adds seriousness). Since it seeks to es-
tablish the impossibility of a beginning of the world only indirectly (via the 
Platonic and Aristotelian axiom) it can dispense with the attribute of 
changelessness added for good measure by Proclus. In his second argument 
(Amm. 115–26; 1078–83), ‘Ammonius’ in fact proceeds to argue directly 
from the changelessness of the creator to the impossibility of a beginning, 
noting in addition that if the creation of something good requires a change 
of mind on the part of the omnipotent creator, the creator must previously 
have been either ignorant of what is good or unwilling to promote it. ‘The 
Christian’s’ reply to this is the classic reply found in (e.g.) Augustine: will-
ing a change is not the same thing as changing one’s will.47 So the 
changelessness of the creator is not imperilled by creationism. 
So far, ‘Ammonius’’ first and second arguments seem, on the whole, 
historically plausible. The three possible explanations for the creator’s wish 
to destroy the world that he examines (i–iii above) may however be a cause 
for suspicion. This trilemma seems to have no parallel in any of Proclus’ 
arguments; on the other hand, it follows rather closely an argument reported 
                                                
46 Apud Philoponum, Aet. 119.13–120.14. 
47 ‘… aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est velle aliquarum rerum mutationem’,  
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol. 1a, q. 19, a. 7 co. Cf. Augustine, Conf. 11.10; 11.30; 12.15; 
12.28; De civ. Dei 11.4; 12.15; 12.18. 
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by ?Philo of Alexandria (Aet. 39–44).48 As it turns out ‘the Christian’ actu-
ally attempts to disarm ‘Ammonius’’ first argument by insisting that the 
creator can and will create something better (that is to say, by embracing the 
first horn of the trilemma). 
The assertion that the best of created things cannot be bettered might 
look a bit too mindless to be fathered on a famous philosopher. But perhaps 
Zacharias is only a trifle unfair. Perhaps the historical Ammonius based his 
argument on the less vulnerable premise that the world is not only the best 
thing there actually is but the best there can possibly be. Or he might have 
pointed out, with ?Philo’s source (Aet. 43), and in the spirit of Proclus’ first 
argument, that the possibility now to create something better would imply a 
previous lack of either goodness or ability on the creator’s part. Be that as it 
may: there are other arguments in the dialogue which are unlikely to have 
been put forward by any Platonists in Zacharias’ time, and which appear to 
serve the primary purpose of providing cues for Christian catch-phrases. I 
will give a few more examples below. 
 
Coeternity 
But for the time being, let us move on to have a look at some of the infer-
ences that have been drawn specifically about Ammonius’ natural philoso-
phy. One of these is, not unexpectedly, that Ammonius believed in the 
coeternity of the world and its creator. As we saw, this thesis, stated in the 
subheading of the dialogue, is the primary target of Zacharias’ attack. In-
deed, it is either expressed by the character ‘Ammonius’ himself or ascribed 
to him by his Christian interlocutor more than a dozen times in the dia-
logue.49 
It should be noted to begin with that there is no independent evidence of 
such a belief on the part of the historical Ammonius. And on the face of it, it 
does not seem very likely that the coeternity thesis would have recom-
mended itself to any Neoplatonist. One reason is that it would probably ap-
pear to them to have exactly the sort of implications that it seemed to 
Zacharias to have: if the world and its creator share in the same eternity, 
they must also be equal in honour (ὁµότιµοι).50 If not in any other respect, 
                                                
48 On the question of the authenticity of this dialogue, see Runia (1981), who is in favour, 
and Skarsten (1987), who is against. 
49 It is stated by ‘Ammonius’ at Amm. 955; 1033–34; 1062–63; 1078–79; and by ‘Gesius’ at 
Amm. 525–26. 
50 Amm. 516–17; cf. Amm. 991; 1286–90; 1360–62. 
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then at least in terms of seniority. But God must be superior to the world in 
every respect (Amm. 953–94). Any Neoplatonist would readily admit that.51 
The Neoplatonists, at least from Proclus onwards, made a clear-cut and 
explicit distinction between sempiternity (or perpetuity), ἀιδιότης κατὰ 
χρόνον, which is the infinite progression in time of the sensible world, and 
what we may call eternity proper, αἰώνιος ἀιδιότης, which is the timeless 
now characteristic of the intelligible world.52 This distinction is ubiquitous 
in the medieval Latin tradition thanks to Boethius, who famously employed 
it in the last book of the Consolation of Philosophy to resolve the apparent 
contradiction between divine omniscience and human free will. 
We know from Ammonius’ commentary on De interpretatione 9 that his 
position on omniscience and free will was fairly close to that of Boethius.53 
Therefore, it is tempting to quote the last book of the Consolation on his 
behalf: 54 
When some people hear that Plato thought this world neither had a beginning in time 
nor will ever have an end, they mistakenly conclude that the created world is coeternal 
(coaeternus) with the Creator. However, to be led through the endless life Plato attrib-
utes to the world is one thing; to embrace simultaneously the whole presence of endless 
life is quite another, and it is this latter that is proper to the divine mind (Cons. 5, prosa 
6, sects 9–10; trans. R. T. Miller). 
But this is not how the literary character ‘Ammonius’ responds. On the 
contrary, he is reduced to silence and finally seems to acknowledge that he 
has been refuted by ‘the Christian’ (Amm. 995–1002; 1092; 1126–27). 
Evidently, then, the ascription of the coeternity thesis to Ammonius is 
suspicious. On closer inspection, the term συναΐδιος and its cognates (re-
turning more than 900 results in TLG) turn out to be exclusively restricted 
to Christian authors.55 It seems likely that they were coined for a theological 
                                                
51 Even in Zacharias’ dialogue, ‘Ammonius’ as well as ‘Gesius’ deny that the world is 
equal in honour to God (Amm. 122–23; 524–26). 
52 For Proclus, see especially Inst. Theol. 55.16–21. The distinction is prefigured in several 
earlier philosophers, most notably Plotinus (Enn. 3.7.5; cf. also Porphyry, In Tim. fr. 46.10–
15 Sodano). In more inchoate forms it is found even in Aristotle (Cael. 1.9, 279a18–b3) 
and Plato (Tim. 38c1–3), on whom it is fathered by Boethius (Cons. liber 5, prosa 6, sect. 
14). 
53 In Int. 132.8–137.11, esp. 136.1–25 on the gods’ unitary, definite and immutable knowl-
edge of things past and future. 
54 For another defence of the eternalist position in similar terms, see Simplicius’ reply to 
‘John the Grammarian’s argument’ at In Phys. 1327.29–1328.35. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, 
Aet. mund. 
55 Calcidius’ report of Numenius, printed by des Places as fragment 52, is usually taken to 
be more or less literal, but the inference about the coeternity of uncreated matter with God 
may well be Calcidius’ own: ‘atque ita, quia generationis sit fortuna posterior, inornatum 
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context (the Son being coeternal with the Father). At any rate this is how 
they are used by the vast majority of authors. The first times they are used 
with reference to the coeternity between the world and its creator seem to be 
in a passage in Gregory of Nyssa (Contra Eun. 1.1.359.7) and, more im-
portantly, in chapter three of Basil of Caesarea’s first homily on the 
Hexaemeron. 
There is every reason to think that Basil’s first homily is in fact the 
source of the term in Zacharias (as it undoubtedly is in Procopius of Gaza’s 
Genesis commentary). First and foremost, there are a number of other ar-
guments in the Ammonius that are identical or at least very similar to argu-
ments in this homily; in a few instances they are expressly credited to Basil 
(Amm. 662; 906; 1290). For instance, one of the four positive arguments in 
favour of creationism put forward by ‘the Christian’ (repeatedly: Amm. 203–
7; 658–67; 931–36) is the following: everything composed of destructible 
parts is destructible as a whole; the world is composed of destructible parts; 
hence it is destructible as a whole; by the Platonic and Aristotelian axiom 
that what is destructible has also been created, then, the world has been cre-
ated. 
For all ‘the Christian’s’ claims of irrefutability (Amm. 663–67), the 
argument is not strikingly cogent. Its first premise was denied in antiquity 
by Theophrastus (apud ?Philonem, Aet. mund. 143) as well as Galen (apud 
Philoponum, Aet. 592.5–7; 599.17–601.20), and its second premise would 
undoubtedly have been denied by the historical Ammonius, as it was by 
Proclus, who indeed based an argument in favour of the indestructibility of 
the world as a whole on the indestructibility of the heavens (apud 
Philoponum, Aet. 477.14–479.10). It is also, from a Neoplatonic as well as a 
Christian point of view, of dubious parentage, since it was probably first 
used by Epicurus (it plays a role in Lucretius, De rerum natura 5, 236–323). 
Still, as the Christian points out, it rests on patristic authority, for it is show-
cased in Basil’s first homily on the Hexaemeron, chapter three.56 
The same is true of ‘the Christian’s’ reply to ‘Gesius’’ final argument in 
Zacharias’ dialogue. As ‘Gesius’ maintains, rather absurdly, that the spheri-
cal shape of the world itself precludes a beginning and an end, ‘the 
Christian’ sees his chance to quote Basil (In Hex. 1.3.9–11) to the effect that 
                                                                                                                        
illud minime generatum aequaevum deo, a quo est ordinatum, intelligi debeat.’ 
56 In Hex. 1.3.30–32. Cf. Lactantius, Div. inst. 7.1, col. 736A. The argument is reported by 
?Philo, Aet. mund. 124. According to McDiarmid (1940: 243) it is ‘undoubtedly Stoic or 
Epicurean’. Sedley (1998) thinks it is Epicurean (On Nature 10 or 11), the refutation re-
ported at Aet. mund. 143 being by Theophrastus. Sharples (1998: 131–42) agrees with 
Sedley. 
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even a circle has a beginning, at the points, namely, where the geometri-
cian’s compasses are placed (Amm. 896–907).57 
In her edition of Zacharias’ dialogue, Maria Minniti Colonna, who was 
well aware of the clear and express distinction between worldly sempiter-
nity and divine eternity in Proclus, concluded that the thesis of the world’s 
coeternity with its creator must probably have been original with the histori-
cal Ammonius (1973: 52). It should be said in all fairness that Minniti 
Colonna elsewhere wisely cautioned against taking all the arguments attrib-
uted by Zacharias to his teacher to reflect Ammonius’ real views. But in this 
particular case she thought she had a good reason for relying on Zacharias. 
The reason was that the coeternity thesis also figures in Philoponus’ Contra 
Proclum. And Philoponus, as we know, was also a student of Ammonius. 
Thus we would seem to have two independent witnesses in agreement. 
Minniti Colonna’s conclusion is, however, severely undermined by the 
uncertainty that surrounds the scope of the agreement as well as the degree 
of independence between Philoponus and Zacharias. To begin with, it 
should be noted that Philoponus never attributes the thesis to Ammonius. 
Indeed, Ammonius is never even mentioned in Contra Proclum. It is true 
that, when he first introduces the thesis, Philoponus does attribute it to some 
anonymous opponents (in the plural, like in the Boethius passage quoted 
earlier), and it may seem a natural inference that these are contemporary 
Neoplatonists, but the context suggests otherwise. 
This context is related to those passages in the Ammonius in which 
Zacharias advances two positive arguments in favour of creationism turning 
on the notion of coeternity. So let us have a quick glance at these. The first 
argument comes in the conversation with ‘Gesius’ (Amm. 516–34). I have 
already alluded to it. If we grant that the world is coeternal with God, ‘the 
Christian’ says, then by the same token it will also be equal to Him in hon-
our (ὁµότιµος). But equating the glory of the finite and perceptible world 
with that of the boundless and invisible nature would certainly be impious.58 
‘Gesius’’ reply takes the form of a counterexample to the underlying as-
sumption that all things contemporaneous (or coeternal) are also equal in 
honour: shadows are contemporaneous with the bodies that cast them, but 
                                                
57 For this argument, see also Wolfson (1966: 352–54). 
58 This argument seems to develop a train of thought in Basil, In Hex. 2.2: if uncreated mat-
ter existed it would be equal in honour (ὁµότιµος) to God, the thought of which is abhor-
rent. The description of the finite world and the boundless nature closely follows Basil’s 
wording in In Hex. 1.3.25–29 (the very same passage in which the coeternity thesis is men-
tioned). 
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are also caused by them and on that account inferior in honour.59 ‘The 
Christian’ retorts that a body may indeed be a cause of the shadow, but not 
the only cause—since there also has to be light—and, more importantly, not 
a volitional cause. 
The assumption that God is a (productive and thus) volitional cause 
comes into play in the second argument. This argument is repeated with 
some variations a number of times (see above, n. 40), but I think the follow-
ing (abridged) example, from the second conversation with ‘Ammonius’ 
(Amm. 1028–55), is sufficiently representative. 
 
Chr. Do you think it is possible for simultaneously existing things to be each others’ 
productive causes? 
Amm. Not at all. 
Chr. Would you say that coeternal things are simultaneous?  
Amm. Of necessity. 
Chr. And the world is coeternal with God? 
Amm. Indeed. 
Chr. And God, you say, is the productive cause of the world? 
Amm. Of course he is. 
Chr. Well, can’t you see that this is impossible on your views, provided the world is not 
some sort of a shadow, or else is the effect of its cause either in the sense of a comple-
ment of a substance (like the sun’s radiance) or in the sense of being consubstantial with 
it (like the Son with the Father). But this cause is productive, and furthermore conscious 
and volitional (ἔµφρων καὶ προαιρετική). So one premise has to be rejected: either 
God and the world are not coeternal, or God is not the productive cause of the world. 
 
Both of Zacharias’ positive arguments are clearly developments of Basil’s 
exegesis of the word ἐποίησεν in Genesis 1:1, in chapter seven of his first 
homily on the Hexaemeron. Basil’s point is precisely that this word is used 
in order to make clear that the world is in the strict sense a product, that is to 
say, a separate artifact brought forth by an act of will on the part of the 
artificer, wherefore it is also necessary for it to be posterior in time to the 
productive cause, since any effect simultaneous with its cause must neces-
sarily be an involuntary effect, like a shadow or a shaft of light (In Hex. 
1.7.12–26). Basil’s analogies (ὥσπερ τῆς σκιᾶς τὸ σῶµα καὶ τῆς λαµ-
πηδόνος τὸ ἀπαυγάζον) are quoted word by word at Amm. 757–58. 
If we now turn to the passage in which the coeternity thesis is first intro-
duced in Philoponus’ Contra Proclum (Aet. 14.18–17.14), we shall find that 
                                                
59 ‘Gesius’ indicates that he has borrowed his counterexample (φασί, l. 522). Minniti 
Colonna in her apparatus fontium draws attention to Plotinus, Enn. 4.3.9; ibid. 6.3.7; 
Sallustius, De deis et mundo 7.2. See below, p. 102. Cf. also Aeneas, Theophrastus 45.21–
46.16, part of which (46.2–5) is quoted verbatim in ‘the Christian’s’ reply.  
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Philoponus, too, is arguing that the analogies with shadows and light ad-
duced by the proponents of the thesis fail conspicuously to show that the 
thesis is true. The difference between him on the one hand and Basil and 
Zacharias on the other is that Philoponus is not using the premise that voli-
tional causes must be temporally prior to their effects, but the more general 
one that all positive effects, in so far as they are not part of the substance of 
their causes, must be temporally posterior to their cause. As for the analo-
gies, he quickly dismisses the shadow as a merely negative effect, but ar-
gues at length that there are two kinds of light: that which coexists with the 
sun is part of the substance of its cause, the sun; whereas the kind of light 
that flows from the sun into the air can evidently be destroyed before the sun 
is, and thus it is also (temporally) pre-existed by the sun.60 
Apart from this, there are also certain features shared by the passages in 
Zacharias and Philoponus as against that in Basil. The immediate connec-
tion of the coeternity thesis with the two analogies is one such feature: in 
Basil (In Hex. 1.7.18–26.) the analogies are simply ascribed to ‘some of 
those who imagine that the world has co-existed with God from eternity’ 
(and if we are to take him strictly at his word these thinkers must have ex-
isted before Moses, since he is the one supposed to have chosen the word 
ἐποίησεν in order to correct their mistake). In addition, while Basil’s ver-
sion of the analogy with the shaft of light speaks generally of its cause as 
‘the source of radiation’ (τὸ ἀπαυγάζον, In Hex. 1.7.23), Zacharias iden-
tifies this source as the sun (Amm. 1042), whereas Philoponus speaks alter-
nately of the sun and ‘the fire in our place’ (i.e. the terrestrial region), and 
completely avoids the Basileian terminology of ‘shaft of light’ (λαµπηδών) 
and ‘radiate’ (ἀπαυγάζω). More importantly, the distinction between the 
two kinds of simultaneous effects (negative ones and ones inherent in the 
cause) spelt out clearly by Philoponus is hinted at by Zacharias but com-
pletely absent in Basil. 
Anyway: since the coeternity thesis is mentioned in another chapter of 
Basil’s first homily on the Hexaemeron and several of the arguments put 
forward by Zacharias’ characters are borrowed from this text, it seems plau-
sible to think that the same text is also the source of the coeternity thesis in 
the Ammonius. Since Philoponus introduces the thesis without any mention 
of Ammonius, even though he connects it with the same analogies as does 
Zacharias, the assumption that his anonymous opponents are identical with 
                                                
60 In a decidedly more Neoplatonic spirit, ?Elias, In Cat. 120.16–19, refers to the analogy of 
the sun and its light in illustration of God’s non-temporal and causal pre-existence to the 
world (allegedly reporting Aristotle in the Metaphysics). 
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Ammonius is unnecessary and gratuitous. And since the thesis was never 
defended by any Neoplatonists, and furthermore conflicts with fundamental 
Neoplatonic views shared also by Ammonius, there is, in conclusion, no 
reason apart from Zacharias’ attribution for thinking that Ammonius sub-
scribed to it, and several reasons for thinking that he did not. 
The mysterious proponents of the coeternity thesis referred to by 
Philoponus, if they have ever existed, are very probably older than Basil. 
Matthias Baltes claimed (1976: 163–69) that all three passages discussed 
above (and three others making use of the same or similar analogies) de-
rived ‘with certainty’ from a lost work by Porphyry, perhaps his commen-
tary on the Timaeus.61 I will not dispute the possibility that the examples of 
the shaft of light and the shadow were taken by Basil from a context in 
which Porphyry was trying to show that there is nothing to prevent a cause 
and its effect being simultaneous (like ?Elias in the passage cited above, n. 
60, which is not discussed by Baltes), even if I doubt very much that 
Porphyry would have refused to admit that the world’s coming-into-being 
issues from God (a refusal which Basil attributes to his source, In Hex. 
1.7.19–20), or indeed that he would have conceived of the eternity of the 
world and that of God as being one and the same thing (a view which Basil, 
as we have seen, does not expressly attribute to his source, but Zacharias 
and Philoponus do).62 I do think, however, that it is beyond reasonable 
doubt that Zacharias took these examples, as he took the argument from the 
destructibility of the parts (and the refutation of the argument from the 
spherical shape of the world, and very probably many other things), from 
Basil. After all, he quotes his ipsissima verba. Thus, in so far as Philoponus 
agrees with Zacharias against Basil, this cannot be used, as Baltes seems to 
have thought, as evidence for the content of a common source, but rather 
indicates Philoponus’ dependence on Zacharias. 
 
The aim of Zacharias’ and Philoponus’ anti-eternalist works 
Some degree of acquaintance with the work of Zacharias on the part of 
Philoponus is likely anyway. Edward Watts has suggested (2005) that the 
Ammonius was written especially for the needs of Christian philosophy stu-
                                                
61 The other passages discussed by Baltes are from Augustine, De civ. Dei 10.31, and 
Sallustius, De deis et mundo 7.2, in addition to Aeneas, Theophr. 45.21–46.16, mentioned 
above, n. 59. An interesting variation, not discussed by Baltes, is provided by Theophanes 
of Nicaea (d. c. 1381), who, while retaining some of Basil’s (or rather Zacharias’) language 
(ἀπαυγασµάτων), substitutes an analogy with reflections from lustrous bodies for that of 
shadows (Apodeixis 3; see Polemis 2000: 35*). 
62 For the distinction in Porphyry, see In Tim. fr. 46.10–15 Sodano. 
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dents in Alexandria, who might have been so impressed by the personal 
authority of their Neoplatonic teachers that they were tempted to experiment 
with pagan worship. In order to forestall this, Zacharias is supposed to have 
tried to subvert the teachers’ authority by portraying them in an unflattering 
way.  
To my mind, this is in part, but only in part, a plausible suggestion. The 
plausible part is the idea that the dialogue was written for the needs of 
Christian philosophy students in Alexandria. My reservations have to do (1) 
with the fact that the stated purpose of the Ammonius is to counter eternal-
ism, not pagan worship; and (2) with the possibility that Watts is underesti-
mating the degree to which at least some of the arguments are seriously 
intended. For as we have seen, there are many details in Zacharias’ portrayal 
of Ammonius’ and Gesius’ views that correspond perfectly well with what 
we can infer from other sources, despite the fact that there are others that 
cannot possibly be true to life. After all, most of the arguments attributed to 
Ammonius and Gesius have parallels in Proclus apud Philoponum. Besides, 
if, as seems reasonable to think, Zacharias was trying to reinforce the 
Christian philosophy students’ belief in Christian creationism, it is difficult 
to see why he would have thought that denigrating their eternalist teachers 
should be a particularly effective strategy, when, arguably, it was more 
likely to be counterproductive. Eternalism was spread through arguments. 
Accordingly, it had to be countered with arguments. I cannot see any reason 
to doubt the sincerity of Zacharias’ conviction (expressed in Amm. 148–53) 
that creationism could be philosophically defended. This is, after all, a 
conviction he shared with Philoponus and many mediaeval philosophical 
authors. 
Still, if Zacharias’ aim really was to provide an antidote to the pernicious 
doctrine of eternalism, spread among his Christian brethren by the Neopla-
tonic teachers, one probably has to conclude that he was not entirely suc-
cessful. Not so much, perhaps, by reason of the occasional misrepresenta-
tions of his opponent’s views, whether these were motivated by polemical 
purposes or simply the result of a lack of understanding,63 as because his 
positive arguments in favour of creationism are less than philosophically 
satisfactory. One can only presume that there were Christian students of 
Ammonius who felt that something more compelling than this was needed, 
                                                
63 I note with interest that Krausmüller suspects Aeneas of Gaza of exactly the failure to 
understand ‘the distinction between “supra-temporal” and “temporal” … one rather gets the 
sense that he sees eternity simply as a never-ending time-span’ (2009: 56). 
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if the eternalists’ challenge were to be met. On second thought, one can do 
better than presume. We know there was at least one such student. 
If it is true that the Ammonius was composed for an audience of Christian 
philosophy students in Alexandria, Philoponus certainly belonged to the in-
tended readership. According to Minniti Colonna (1973: 44–45) the 
Ammonius should be dated certainly after 491, probably after 512 and 
possibly even after 518. In 512 Philoponus was twenty-something, a bril-
liant student in Ammonius’ seminar, entrusted with preparing his teacher’s 
lecture-notes for publication.64 
Obviously, Philoponus’ three works on the eternity of the world are not 
immaculately free from malicious artifice. As we have seen, for instance, he 
too ascribes the coeternity thesis to his opponents, even once suggesting that 
the main thrust of Proclus’ sixth argument is to convince us that Plato con-
sidered the existence of the heavens to be coeternal with the Creator.65 
Nonetheless they constitute an undeniable advance on the works of Aeneas, 
Procopius and Zacharias. They are basically serious full-scale philosophical 
treatises proceeding on the assumption that the Christian creationist doctrine 
can be satisfactorily defended by rational argument. The first work, Contra 
Proclum, quotes in full Proclus’ arguments before setting out to refute them. 
After all, that is how Proclus’ arguments have survived. Likewise, the sec-
                                                
64 If Watts (2005: 219) is right in assuming that the Ammonius was first composed in the 
490s and revised in the 520s, the second edition would have appeared just in time for being 
taken into account in the Contra Proclum. However, the only argument he presents in fa-
vour of his assumption, namely that since the discussions with Ammonius pick up on ideas 
in Aeneas’ Theophrastus, supposedly composed in the late 480s, whereas the discussions 
with Gesius do not, the Gesius episode was probably written later (2005: 229 n. 51), fails to 
convince, partly because it seems to rest on false premises. As far as the subject of the eter-
nity of the world is concerned I have been able to find three ideas common to the Theo-
phrastus and the Ammonius. One of them is the idea that there is no need to suppose that 
the creator was inactive before the creation of the perceptible world, since he was busy cre-
ating the intelligible world (Theophr. 44.19–45.4). In the Ammonius, this idea is expressed 
in the Gesius episode (Amm. 650–52). Another is Basil’s idea that the destructibility of the 
parts entails the destructibility of the whole (Theophr. 48.12–15). In the Ammonius, this 
idea is expressed both in the Gesius episode and in the first conversation with Ammonius 
(Amm. 203–7; 658–67; 931–36). A third is Basil’s idea that the shadow simile employed by 
the Platonists to illustrate the doctrine of eternal creation is irrelevant to the relationship 
between a voluntary creator and his creation. In the Ammonius, this idea is expressed both 
in the Gesius episode and in the second conversation with Ammonius; however, the point 
that an auxiliary cause besides the body is needed to produce a shadow, namely light, is 
common to the Theophrastus (46.2–5) and the Gesius episode (Amm. 536–45, where indeed 
the Theophrastus passage is quoted verbatim) but is not found in the conversation with 
Ammonius (Amm. 1028–55). 
65 Aet. 126.3–11. At Aet. 272.27–273.3 he ascribes to Proclus the view that the soul’s self-
movement entails the coeternity of the body and the soul. 
A case for creationism    105 
 
ond work, Contra Aristotelem, followed the exposition in Physics 8.1 and 
De caelo 1.2–4 more or less point by point. 
And on the whole, Philoponus’ positive arguments in favour of creation-
ism are more compelling than those of Zacharias. That is probably also the 
reason why they went on to have such a spectacular career, and Zacharias’ 
did not. The only Byzantine author on cosmology I know of who does not 
seem to draw at all on Philoponus but instead on Zacharias is Gregory 
Palamas, who bases his own case for creationism, in the first two chapters of 
the Capita philosophica (1347/48), on two bits of evidence: the unimpres-
sive argument, originally deriving from Basil, that the world, being com-
posed of destructible parts, must be destructible as a whole; and the 
testimony of Moses and Christ, which is qualified by Palamas as ‘certain 
and irrefutable proof’ (C. 1–2).66 It may not be fortuitous that the (rare) ab-
sence of Philoponean arguments here coincides with a (likewise rare) repu-
diation of any sort of rationalistic programme: according to Palamas (C. 21), 
facts about the World as a whole, including the fact that it has been created, 
belong in the same epistemological category as facts about God and Man, 
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